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ANTI-TRUST LEGISLATION IN KENTUCKY
By WmLiLLI H. ToWNSEND, LFXINGTON BAR.
Prior to 1890 there was no anti-trust law in Kentucky. The Stat-
utes were silent upon the subject of monopolies and combinations in re-
straint of trade, and the common law, adopted into the jurisprudence of
Kentucky, as decided in the case of Aetna Life Insurance Co. vs. Com-
monwealth, 106 Ky., 864, contained no principle under which these crea-
tures of a new commercial era could be held to a penal liability.
Gradually, however, there crept into the public consciousness the
realization that the old order of things was changing; that competition,
"the life of trade" in the markets of the country was becoming more and
more restrained, and that the purchase and sale of commodities were no
longer regulated by the age-old economic law of supply and demand.
On May 20th, 1890, the Legislature of Kentucky joined the general
crusade against the evils of the trusts and adopted an act known as the
"Anti-Trust Law" being now Chapter 101 of the Kentucky Statutes, of
which section 3915 provides as follows:
"That if any corporation under the laws of Kentucky or un-
der the laws of any other State or country, for transacting any
kind of business in this State, or any partnership, company, firm
or individual, or other association of persons, shall create, estab-
lish, organize or enter into, or become a member of, or a party to,
or in any way interested in any pool, trust, combine, agreement,
confederation or understanding with any other corporation, part-
nership, individual or person, for the purpose of regulating or
controlling or fixing the price of any merchandise, manufactured
articles or property of any kind, or shall enter into, become a mene-
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ber of, or party to or in any way interested in any pool, agreement,
contract, understanding, combination, or confederation, having for
its object the fixing, or in any way limiting the amount of quantity
of any article of property, commodity, or merchandise to be pro-
duced or manufactured, mined, bought or sold shall be deemed
guilty of the crime of conspiracy, and punished therefor as pro-
vided in the subsequent sections of this act."
By the subsequent sections all arrangements made with the intent
or having the effect to limit, fix or change the price or production of sale
of any article, or to restrict or diminish the output of any article, were
declared illegal; no action could be maintained to recover for the price
of any article sold in violation of the act upon any contract made in
violation of it; all persons, corporations or firms violating the provisions
of the act were punished by fine of not less than $500.00 nor more than
$5,000 and forfeiture of charter, and individuals or officers of corpora-
tions were to be punished by fine or imprisonment or both.
In September, 1890, the Constitutional Convention assembled at
Frankfort. This body deliberated at some length upon how the trust
subject should be dealt with by the orgaific law. For reasons not defi-
nitely stated, the members seemed to be dissatisfied with the law enacted
a few months before by the Legislature, a delegate remarking that one
could "drive a coach and four through it." A rigorous and detailed sec-
tion was submitted (Page 3693, Vol. III, Constitutional Debates) which
precipitated a very heated discussion. Some feared that the provision
would impose upon -the farmers of the State, some that the distillers
might be discriminated against, and so on, each member zealously solic-
itous either of the business of which he was a member or of the leading
industry in his particular section of the State.
Finally the idea prevailed that the Convention should not attempt
to enact a complete anti-trust law, but should merely call attention of the
Legislature to this subject in general terms, leaving it unhampered as
to detail. Thereupon, Mr. Twyman's amendment to the first proposed
section was substituted and adopted, being now Section 198 of the present
Constitution, to-wit:
"It shall be the duty of the General Assembly from time to
time, as necessity may require, to enact such-laws as imay be neces-
sary to prevent all trusts,, pools, combinations, or other organiza-
tions, from combining to depreciate below its real value any arti-
cle, or to enhance the cost of'any article above its real value?'
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The Legislature, however, seemed content with the law as it stood,
and took no further action on this subject until 1906. The law remained
just as it had been passed in 1890. In 1899 that statute was brought
before the Court of Appeals for the first time.
The Aetna Insurance Company and eighty-six others were indicted
and convicted in the Franklin Circuit Court on the charge of combining
and conspiring to fix rates on fire insurance in the State. Counsel for
the Commonwealth and for defendants were not agreed upon the meaning
of the term "property" as used in the Statute, the latter contending that
the word was qualified by the adjective "manufactured" and conse-
quently did not embrace "property" of any other class, even if the right
to enter into insurance contracts was property at all, which was not ad-
mitted. In deciding this point, and reversing the judgment of the lower
court (Aetna Insurance Company et all vs. Commonwealth, 106 Ky.,
864) the Court ruled "that althougii an insurance contract was property
and the right to enter into such contract might be property in a sense,
the word.' property' as used in the Statutes (Sec. 3915) does not include
the right to enter into a contract of insurance nor to fix the terms upon
which such a contract will be made ;" and that the word only embraced
property of the same general class or nature as that described previously
by the words, "merchandise and manufactured articles."
The first attack upon the constitutionality of the anti-trust law wds
made in the case of Commonwealth vs. Grinstead & Tinsley (108 Ky.,
59) on appeal from the Whitley Circuit Court, a general demurrer hav-
ing been sustained to the indictment. Affirmance of the judgment was
urged mainly upon the following grounds: (1) That the Act of May,
1890, was inconsistent and in conflict with Section 198 of the Constitu-
tion and consequently inoperative. (2) That the statute is too indefinite
and uncertain to be enforced. In reversing the decision of the lower iri-
bunal,. the Oourt held that Section 198 was not "a grant of power," but
the "imposition of a duty;" that the Constitution forbids a combination
to depreciate any article below its real value, or to enhance the cost of
any article above its real value, leaving the Legislature to enact such
laws as would insure this result; that the Legislature was not limited to
adopting an act, it the language of 'the constitutional provision; and that
if it determined that -the provision of the section could' est be executed
by for±ikding.& combinatitn to ft, control ox regulate tlie pricos or com-
binationswto fix or limit quantity of production, there- was an inclusion,
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but inclusion was not conflict. The Court disposed of the question of
uncertainty in the following language:
"We are unable to see any uncertainty in these provisions. If
the Statute had prohibited an unreasonable advance of prices or an
unjust depreciation, the question would be different. But no
such question is presented. * * * It prohibits any combina-
tion to regulate or fix prices. It also prohibits any combination
to limit production. * * * We cannot see how it could
be more definite."
In Commonwealth vs. Bavarian Brewing Company, &c., 112 Ky.,
92V, -he Court in reply to the suggestion that the Statute made certain
exceptions, said:
"The purpose of the statute is to forbid all combinations to
regulate, fix, or control prices and to leave prices to be regulated
entirely by the law of supply and demand. * * * The statute
makes no such exception. It makes unlawfwl and undertakes to
punishi all agreements for the purpose of controlling the prices
of the article."
It will thus be seen -that in every instance the 'Court insisted that
the statute was all-embracing in scope, unequivocal in meaning, and
must be literally enforced.
On March 21st, 1906, the General Assembly passed what is known
as the "Pooling Act," which provided:
"It is hereby declared lawful for any number of persons to
combine, unite, or pool, any or all of the crops of wheat, tobacco,
corn, oats, hay, or other farm products raised by them, for the
purpose of classifying, grading, storing, holding, selling or dis-
posing of same, either in parcels or as a whole, in order or for the
purpose of obtaining a greater or higher price therefor thair they
might or could obtain or receive by selling said crops separately or
individually."
The Act further provided that all contracts entered into for the
purpose of carrying out the provision above quoted were legal and bind-
ing, and that an agent or agents might be appointed by the parties to
the agreement, with authority to hold, grade and sell the products pooled.
On March 13th, 1908, the.Legislature by an amendment to the for-
,ner Act provided remedy in damages and by injunction for violations
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thereof, and a fine not exceeding $250.00 for any person who should sell
or buy products without the written consent of the agent in charge. In
1910 a further Pooling Act was passed which is now sections 3941-b,
3941-c and 3941-d of the General Statutes. The first section provided:
"That it shall be lawful for the growers of any kind of farm
products to agree to abstain from growing any kind of crops for
any given period of season."
The second provided that it should be lawful for any person or cor-
poration to record a list of the persons pooling products, together with
a description of the land upon which the products are to be grown, in
the clerk's office in the county where the land is situated; and that any
person soliciting or buying such listed property should be subject to fine
or imprisonment or both, while the last section is identical in language
with that part of section 3941-a quoted with the additional provision
that the right to poor should include "products proposed to be raised by
them (any persons) whether or not the said crops have been sown, set,
pitched or planted." This completed what is now Chapter 103-a of the
General Statutes.
What was the effect of these Pooling Acts? "Was it class legislation?
Had the Legislature discriminated against any person or class of per-
sons? Were they not in conflict with the anti-trust law of 1890, since by
permitting the farmers to "combine" they would be able to "control" the
prices of products and by agreeing "to abstain from growing" they could
"fix or limit" the quantity to be produced? These were some of the ques-
tions with which the Courts were almost immediately confionted.
In 1908 the case of Owen County Burley Tobacco Society vs. Brum-
back (128 Ky., 137) went to the Court of Appeals on a motion to dis-
solve an injunction against Brumback restraining him from disposing of
his 1907 crop of tobacco which had been pooled with the Burley Society.
The validity of the Pooling Act was assailed (1) upon the ground that it
was in violation of Section 3 of the Bill of Rights which declared in part
that "no grant of exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges
shall be made to any man or set of men except in consideration of public
service; (2) contrary to section 198 of the Constitution of Kentucky,
(3) and, in contravention of the 14th Amendment of -the Federal Consti-
tutign, providiig. that "no State shall make or enforce any law which
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shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property
without due process-of law, or deny to any person within its julfisdidtion
the equal protection of the law."
In passing on the question involving the Bill of Rights and the 14th
Amendment, the Court said:
"While this section (section 3 of the Bill of Rights) forbids
the Legislature from granting exclusive privileges or emoluments,
except in consideration of public service, it does not deny-the
right to select and classify persons or occupations or the right to
enact reasonable laws for the government of each class that is
dealt with. Looking at the act from this viewpoint, and as simply
selecting a class of persons to deal with, it must be considered,-as
within the power of the Legislature to enact it. The act does -ot
attempt to regulate or control or prescribe any other occupation or
business. * * * No person is objecting because he is denied
the privileges and immuities conferred upon this class of our citi-
zens. It is assailed by one of the class for whose benefits it was
enacted, and who upon the record before us must be treated as
having voluntarily' entered into the agreement authorized by it.
Treating the act solely as a selection of a class of persons upon
whom special privileges are conferred, it is not in contravention
of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
This section has been frequently considered by the Supreme Court
of the United States, and it has been ruled that it does not deny
the State the right to classify and select occupations, trades and
professions."
And as to Section 198 of the State Constitution:
The Constitution does not prohibit trusts, pools, or combina-
tions; nor does it command the General Assembly to enact laws
forbidding trusts, pools or combinations. The law-making de-
partment is left to determine for itself the necessity that exists
for legislation upon this question. The section is not self-exe-
cuting. The Legislature could not enact a law legalizing a pool or
combination of persons for the purpose of enhancing the cost of
an article above its real value or depreciating it below its real
value, yet it may legalize such pool or combination as is created
or organized.for the purpose of obtaining fair and remunerative
prices."
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In the case of Commonwealth vs. International Harvester Co. (131
Ky., 551) the questions of discrimination and uncertainty were again
raised. A very exhaustive opinion was written by Judge O'iRear, in which
a majority of the Court concurred. The Court took the position that the
enactmenfs of 1890 and 1906 and section 198 of the Constitution should
be construed together, and as though all the provisions thereof were con-
tained in a single act; that when so construed there was no conflict nor
any contravention of the Federal Constitution; that all persons were
permitted to combine or pool so long as such combination did not operate
to raise the price of any article or commodity above its real value or de-
crease it below its real value; and that, when a combination did result in
such condition, it thereupon became illegal and all persons so combining,
farmers included, became subject to the penal liability provided in the
original act of 1890.
The court further held that the statutes were not void for uncer-
tainty; that the "real value" of an article or commodity is "itself a fact
susceptible of proof and exact ascertainment. The "real value" spoken of
in the Constitution is the market value. Market value depends wholly
upon proof of pre-existing facts, and therefore may be known at any mo-
ment by anybody."
Judges Barker, Hobson and Lassing dissented to so much of this
opinion as held that prosecutions could any longer be maintained under
the original Act of 1890. They took the position that the Act of 1906, au-
thorizing farmers to do that which had hitherto been forbidden, repealed
the act of 1890 in toto as to farmers and that, if farmers were exempted
from its operation, then under the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States, in Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S., 5140,
it could not be enforced against anybody. They contended that the pen-
alties prescribed in the law of 1890 were for "all combinations to regu-
late, fix, or control prices," and could not apply to a different offense, to-
wit, "a combination to regulate, fix or control prices above or below the
real value." As to the standard of "real value," Judge Hobson, in the
dissenting opinion said:
"Under the rule now declared by the Court it will be a ques-
tion fbr the jury in- each case whether the combination raised the
price above the real value of the article or lowered it below it. To
say that the expression means the market value of the article
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when not affected by abnormal conditions, is only to add to the
confusion; for what are abnormal conditions, and who is the
judge whether the conditions are abnormal? The market value
of an article may be determined with some certainty, but what
its market value will be under different conditions than those
that exist, is speculation pure and simple.'
In the case of International Harvester Co. vs. Commonwealth (137
Ky,, 668) the Court held that to establish a prima facie violation of the
law, as construed in the opinion by Judge O'Rear, the Commonwealth
must show (1) that there had been a combination among all or any of the
producers of a commodity or merchandise, by which its output has been
restricted or controlled alone by the confederates in the scheme; (2)
that the market price of the article was then materially increased; (3)
that the conditions affecting commerce in general are normal; (4) that
the competition otherwise than for the combination complained of would
be fair, and that then the burden shifted to the defense to show excep-
tional conditions affecting the particular commodity as naturally tended
to produce the increase in market price, such as cost of labor, ingredients
or constituent parts, transportation or anything else which legitimately
affected the selling price of the article as compared with its previous
selling price.
The International Harvester Company seems to have been the chief
offender against this law, or at least the attention of grand juries through-
out the State seems to have been more particularly directed to it. There
seems hardly to have been a county in the State which did not return in-
dictments against this concern and conviction followed in almost every
instance. Finally the company removed its principal office or place of
business from Louisville, Ky., revoked the agency of one upon whom pro-
cess could be served, and announced that it has ceased doing business in
the State. They continued, however, to solicit orders within the State
and to receive payment from customers therein. This did not decrease
the number or vigor of the prosecutions against it. And the Court of Ap-
peals in 147 Ky., 655, held that process could be duly served upon its
representatives remaining within the State, an opinion which was later
sustained by the Supreme Court in 234 U. S., 579.
At last the Court of Appeals, having in a period of sixty days af-
firmed judgments against it aggregating many thousands of dollars and
many other cases being then pending, the International Harvester Co.
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sought relief in the Supreme Court. The grounds of appeal to that tri-
bunal were the same as had previously been persistently submitted to the
State Court, to -wit: (1) that the anti-trust law as construed did not
afford the equal protection under the law guaranteed by the 14th Amend-
ment and (2) offered no standard of conduct that it is possible to know.
Mr. Justice Holmes, on the 8th of June, 1914, delivering the opinion of
the Court, in which a majority concurred, reversing the Kentucky Court
of Appeals, upon the question of "real value" as a standard, said:
"Value is the effect in exchange of the relative social desire
for compared objects expressed in terms of a common denomina-
tor. It is a fact and generally is more or less easy to ascertain.
But what it would be with such increase of a never extinguished
competition as it might be guessed would have existed had the
combination not been made, with exclusion of the actual effect of
other abnormal influences, and, it would seem with exclusion also
of any increased efficiency in the machines but with the inclusion
of the effect of the combination so far as it was economically bene-
ficial to itself and the community, is a problem that no human in-
genuity could solve. The reason is not the general uncertainty
of a jury trial, but that the elements necessary to determine the
imaginary ideal are uncertain both in nature and degree of effect
to the acutest commercial mind. The very community, the in-
tensity of whose wish relatively to its other competing desires
determines the price that it would give, has to be supposed differ-
ently organized and subject to other influences than those under
which it acts. It is easy to put simple cases; but the one before
us is at least as complex as we have supposed, and the law must
be judged by it. In our opinion it cannot stand. If business is to
go on, men must unite to do it and must sell their wares. To com-
pel them to guess on peril of indictment what the community
would have given for them if the continually changing conditions
were other than they are, to an uncertain extent; to divine pro-
phetically what the reaction of only partially determined facts
would be upon the imaginations and desires of purchases, is to
exact gifts that mankind does not possess."
So ended and rather ignominiously the anti-trust law of Kentucky.
Through the labyrinth of legislation and judicial construction it had
wound its way "from the cradle to the grave," losing strength and vitality
the while until, with the decision of the Supreme Court, the circle was
complete. "Prior to May, 1890, there was no anti-trust law in Ken-
tucky." There is none now.
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The Legislature will convene with the New Year. An analysis of
the situation indicates three possible courses, one of which it may adopt
in relation to this subject. First, it can leave matters as they stand, per-
mitting combination to be pitted against combination upon the theory
that one may check the other. Second, it can go to the opposite extreme
and again prohibit all combinations whatsoever. Third, it can pursue a
middle course either by a process of classification or by prohibiting only
"unreasonable" restraint of trade.
The first method will hardly be seriously considered. Few would
care to see Kentucky a bull-ring for warring combinations, and especially
at the invitation of the Legislature. Besides the struggle would be un-
equal. History has demonstrated that as between the buyer or manufac-
turer on one side and the producer or consumer on the other, aggression
has most often come from the former. Gigantic monopolies, such as the
American Tobacco Company, International Harvester Company and the
Standard Oil Company, have been composed of originally independent
corporate entities. Fortunately most corporations, like individuals, are
law-abiding. But the fact remains that the structure of the corporate
body is peculiarly adapted to that concentration so necessary to create and
maintain a monopoly. This is not true with the producer or consumer
and particularly the agriculturist. Rural communities are not sufficiently
correlated, each section and each individual being surrounded by differ-
ent conditions, financial and otherwise, to make even a defensive monop-
oly possible. The pool legalized by the Legislature of 1906 was called
into existence through the domination of the tobacco market by the To-
bacco trust. It has not corrected the evils for which it was intended. On
the principle of "fighting the devil with fire," it has proved wholly inad-
equate. Even as I write, a news dispatch states that the fate of the
Planters' Protective Association of Kentucky and Tennessee is hanging
in the balance, and that, unless 60 per cent of this year's planting is
pledged by October 31st, the association must disband. It would seem
therefore imperative that the Legislature enact a law of some kind.
Existing economic conditions, however, argue against the iron-clad,
all-embracing statute of a quarter century ago. Co-operation is not
monopoly. To a certain extent at least, it is true, as the learned Justice
observes, "'It business is to go on, men must unite to do it," and comabina-
tions in business, within reasonable boimds, has not produced the evils
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anticipated back in the early nineties, when the subject was new. On the
contrary, it has been demonstrated to be necessary and beneficial to all
concerned, considering the enormous scale upon which many enterprises
are organized and are compelled to operate at this day and time. By
legitimate co-operation, the cost of production and the expense of market-
ing may be decreased while efficiency is increased, much to the advantage
of manufacturer and consumer alike. Nowhere is the new conception of
dealing with this subject more clearly contrasted with the old than in
the Supreme Court of the United States as indicated in the Freight and
Joint Traffic cases; 166 U. S., 290; 171 U. S., 505, and the Standard Oil
and American Tobacco cases, 221 U. S., 1-116. Therefore, not until it has
been proved that monopoly cannot be prevented nor restraint of trade
controlled except by an absolute prohibition would it be wise to return
to the former statute or to enact a more drastic one.
A middle course, recognizing that it is the abuse of power resulting
from combination rather than the combination itself which is harmful,
would be more in keeping with the spirit of the age. Such a course could
be followed by classification, separating the producer and seller from the
buyer and placing the prohibition on 'the offending class, whichever it
might be, leaving the other unrestricted. It would be protested no doubt
that this violated the "equality clause" of the Federal Constitution, the
contention being based on the ruling in Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe
Co., 184 U. S., 540, which declared the Illinois anti-trust law unconstitu-
tional because agriculturists alone were exempt from its provisions. It
will be observed, however, that this statute is more than a classification.
Tt is a diseriination. It does not treat all in the selling class alike. By
classification, all classes need not be given equal privileges, but all mem-
bers within a given class must be. Agriculturists were but a single unit
within fb selling class. If this law had exempted all sellers or vendors
and prohibited all purchasers it would undoubtedly have been constitu-
tional under the decision of the Supreme Court which upheld the anti-
trusi law of Missouri (International iHarvester Co. vs. Missouri, 234
U. S., 199) in an opinion rendered upon the very same day that the
Kentiucky law was declared unconstitutional. This law prohibited com-
binations by manufacturers and vendors of articles and sellers of com-
modities, but permitted it to purchasers of such articles, the court saying:
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"The foundation of our decision is, of course, the power of
classification which legislation may exercise and the cases we
have cited as well as others which, may be cited. demonstrate that
some .latitude must be allowed to the legislative judgment in se-
lecting the "basis of community." If this power of classification
did not exist to what straits legislation would be brought"
But classification in Kentucky would present certain difficulties,
from the fact that all the concerns which have been declared monopolies
or combinations in restraint of trade are not in the same class. If buyers
were prohibited, whilst sellers or vendors remained unrestricted, the
American Tobacco Company would be controlled, but the Harvester
Company, being in the selling class, would not be. If, on the other hand,
the prohibition be reversed the Harvester Company would be controlled,
but the American Tobacco Company, in the buying class, would escape.
After all, everything being considered, it seems best to enact a law
permitting all classes to combine or co-operate so long as there is no
monopoly or unreasonable restraint of trade. It has been expressly held
that there is no constitutional difficulty in the way of enforcing the
criminal part of such an act (Nash vs. United States, 229 U. S., 373).
Such a law, rigidly enforced, emphasizing the personal liability of
officers of offending corporations, carrying with it for violation a heavy
fine and forfeiture of charters for corporations and both fine and impris-
onment for individuals, would permit farmers and producers to organize
for the purpose of grading and storing their products and establishing
and maintaining favorable market conditions, and at the same time en-
able corporations to reduce the cost of production, increase their effi-
ciency and better serve the public, thereby effectually disposing of a
thing which has perplexed the Legislature, confused the judiciary and
oppressed the people of Kentucky throughout the last quarter of century.
